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A Monetary Business Cycle Model for India
September 17, 2019
Abstract
We build and calibrate a New Keynesian monetary business cycle model for the
Indian economy to study why monetary transmission is weak. Our baseline model fea-
tures a variety of banking and financial sector frictions. An augmented model adds an
informal sector to the baseline model. The predominant channel of monetary transmis-
sion is a credit channel. Throughout we compare the impact of two monetary policy
instruments - base money shocks and policy interest rate shocks — on aggregate output.
Our main finding is that base money shocks have a larger and more persistent e§ect on
output than an interest rate shock, as in the data. We show that the presence of an in-
formal sector hinders monetary transmission. We also show that financial repression, in
the form of a statutory liquidity ratio and administered interest rates, does not weaken
monetary transmission, which is contrary to the consensus view in policy discussions
on Indian monetary policy. Our framework is general enough to be relevant for the
study of monetary transmission in other emerging markets and developing economies
featuring a sizeable informal sector and a variety of banking and financial frictions.
Keywords : Monetary Business Cycles, Monetary Transmission, Inflation Targeting,
Informal Economy, Indian Economy.
JEL Codes : E31, E32, E44, E52, E63.
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1 Introduction
With the formal adoption of inflation targeting by the Reserve Bank of India, monetary
policy in India has undergone a major overhaul. India is now a flexible inflation targeter,
where a newly convened monetary policy committee (as of September 2016) is tasked to
maintain a medium term CPI-headline inflation at 4%, within a floor of 2% and a ceiling of
6%.1 Despite the adoption of flexible inflation targeting, monetary transmission in India is
found to be partial, asymmetric and slow. Mishra, Montiel and Sengupta (2016) find that not
only is the pass-through from the policy rate to the bank lending rates incomplete, but there
is little empirical support for any e§ect of monetary policy shocks on aggregate demand.2
Consistent with these findings, the "Report of the Expert Committee to Strengthen the
Monetary Policy Framework" (2014), also known as the Urjit Patel Committee Report,
highlights several structural factors that hinder monetary transmission in India, such as
the role of financial repression in the form of SLR, small savings schemes (with administered
interest rates), and the presence of a large informal sector among others.3 In addition, shocks
to liquidity, or base money, such as currency demand, bank reserves (required plus excess),
government deposits with the Reserve Bank of India, and net foreign market operations,
complicate the alignment of the policy Repo rate - the short term signalling rate - with the
overnight weighted average call rate (WACR) under the liquidity adjustment facility.4
This paper develops a closed economy New Keynesian (NK) monetary business cycle
model of the Indian economy to understand why monetary transmission is weak.5 Our core
1Some form of inflation targeting had become common in several emerging markets by 2005. The shift
to market based monetary policy operations also has had the e§ect of increasing the role of interest rates in
the economy. See Mohanty and Rishabh (2016).
2Both Mishra, Montiel and Sengupta (2016) and Mohanty and Rishab (2016) provide recent surveys of
monetary transmission in India and emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs), respectively. See
also Das (2015).
3The SLR, or the statutory liquidity ratio, provides a captive market for government securities and
helps to artificially suppress the cost of borrowing for the Government, dampening the transmission of
interest rate changes across the term structure. See the Urjit Patel Committee Report (2014). See
https://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=30446 for the details of the monetary policy
committee report.
4Since 2001, the Reserve Bank of India has conducted monetary policy through a corridor system called
the LAF (liquidity adjustment facility). The LAF essentially allows banks to undertake collateralized
lending and borrowing to meet short term asset-liability mismatches. The Repo rate is the rate at which
banks borrow money from the RBI by selling short term government securities to the RBI, and then "re-
purchases" them back. A reverse Repo operation takes place when the RBI borrows money from banks
by lending securities. See Mishra, Montiel and Sengupta (2016, pages 73-74). Banks can also borrow from
the RBI for additional liquidity (over and above their Repo borrowings) at the Marginal Standing Facility
(MSF) rate.
5Using a SOE-NK-DSGE setup, Banerjee and Basu (2017) explore the exchange rate channel of monetary
transmission in the presence of trade and financial openness for India. They find no evidence in favor of
this channel. The Indian banking sector also has limited exposure to foreign economies. As per the Country
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framework is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a banking sector.
Following Mishkin (1995), we define monetary transmission as the real e§ect (particularly,
the output e§ect) of monetary policy. The predominant transmission channel in our model
is a credit channel which is activated by a standard new Keynesian sticky price mechanism.
A change in monetary policy first impacts inflation and then output via an inflation-real
marginal cost channel. The credit channel is then triggered through a novel adjustment
of a bank’s precautionary reserves. This explains the subsequent dynamics of output. By
weak monetary transmission, we mean how frictions in the economy impair these adjustment
thereby reducing the full impact of monetary policy on the real economy.6 Throughout we
compare the monetary transmission e§ects of two policy instruments — a base money shock
and an interest rate policy shock — on the real economy. We show that the transmission
mechanism di§ers depending on whether the policy instrument is the monetary base or the
policy rate. In general, we find that although monetary transmission is weak when the policy
rate is changed, it is relatively stronger when the base money is shocked. Our results can be
seen to be consistent with the stylized facts that we report in this paper. It is also broadly
consistent with several papers on the weak monetary transmission of India including Mishra,
Montiel and Sengupta (2016).
Our baseline framework is a variant of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model with standard features on the production side which includes capital goods, retail and
wholesale sectors. The retail sector has monopolistic power of price setting. Retail prices are
sticky due to quadratic price adjustment costs as in Rotemberg (1982) and indexed to steady
state inflation as in Gerali et al. (2010). This allows monetary policy to have real e§ects.
There are three new features in our DSGE model. First, it has a competitive commercial
banking sector which is subject to (i) a statutory liquidity requirement (SLR) and (ii) a
reserve requirement. Second, the model has a postal sector which attracts deposit from
the households at the administered interest rate exogenously set by the government. The
presence of SLR and administered interest rate capture the essence of financial repression in
the Indian economy. Third, commercial banks hold precautionary excess reserves because
Report No. 17/390, cross border lending and borrowing of Indian banks are small, at 10 percent, and 14
percent of GDP, respectively. Hence, we premise our analysis on a closed economy framework, so that we can
focus more on domestic attributes that hinder monetary transmission such as the informal sector. See also
Eggertsson, Juelsrud and Wold (2017) for a closed economy model that focuses on monetary transmission.
6In the Indian context, there are very few studies on monetary transmission using a DSGE framework.
See Gabriel et al. (2012) for an early attempt. Banerjee and Basu (2017) develop a small open economy
DSGE model for India but do not study monetary transmission. Our paper fills this gap. Other papers
that study monetary transmission in the Indian context empirically also find that the credit channel is the
strongest channel of monetary transmission in India. See, for instance, Aleem (2010) and Bhatt and Kishor
(2013).
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of a withdrawal risk as in Chang et al. (2014). An endogenous bank reserve demand
makes the monetary base an e§ective demand management tool. In an extended version of
the model, we di§erentiate between a "banked" population, that intermediates through the
formal banking system, and an "unbanked" population comprising rule of thumb consumers,
that uses cash as a medium of transaction. Our rationale for adding an unbanked population
is to proxy for a large informal sector in India which is characterized by segmented labor
markets. Taken together, these features provide a more realistic description of banking
intermediation in the transmission of monetary impulses both in the Indian and EMDE
context.
A novel feature of our model is that we allow the short term government bond rate
and the monetary base to be treated as two independent monetary policy tools. While the
Central Bank follows a simple money supply rule to target long run inflation, the short term
government bond rate - which we use as a proxy for the policy rate set by the Central Bank
- follows a Taylor rule. In this respect, our model departs from the standard New Keynesian
model of Gali (2008). Having two monetary instruments enables us to assess monetary
transmission channels for alternative policy rules.
Our calibrated baseline model allows us to highlight three key results. First, we identify
the transmission mechanism of base money shocks and policy interest rate shocks to the rest
of the economy. We show that an expansionary base money shock leads to higher inflation.
The rise in inflation raises real marginal cost which leads to a rise in the value of the marginal
product of labor and capital. Wholesale firms buy new capital goods financed by commercial
bank lending. This stimulates investment, hours worked, and capital accumulation. This
is the core transmission mechanism of a base money shock which combines the standard
NK real marginal cost-inflation channel with the credit channel. On the other hand, when
monetary policy is set using a Taylor rule, a fall in the policy rate (the government bond
rate), also has similar expansionary e§ects on the economy, but the real e§ects are weaker
compared to a money base shock. This happens because the monetary base has a direct and
stronger e§ect on inflation compared to a policy rate shock. Thus the inflation-real marginal
cost nexus works more strongly in case of a base money shock than a policy rate shock. In
the calibrated model we show that the impact e§ect of output with respect to a monetary
base shock is significantly bigger and lasts longer than the output response with respect to
a negative policy rate shock. This agrees well with the empirical VAR impulse responses
reported in Section 2.
Second, our baseline model shows that nearly half of the fluctuations (variance) in output
are explained by TFP shocks and approximately 32% is explained by fiscal shocks. Monetary
policy, in terms of interest rate shocks and base money shocks, explain a moderate fraction
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of output variation - approximately 21%. Within this, the monetary base accounts for 20%.
A similar pattern of variance decomposition is observed in the extended model with an
informal sector. The relative importance of monetary policy shocks (money base and policy
rate) however declines to approximately 16%, with the loss picked up by the fiscal shock. In
the augmented model with an informal sector, when we set the proportion of rule of thumb
consumers to zero, the contribution of base money shock and policy rate shock to output
increases by 32% and 29%, respectively. This result indicates that the existence of rule of
thumb, or unbanked consumers, poses an obstacle to monetary transmission in India.
Third, our sensitivity experiments with respect to structural and policy parameters in-
dicate that the statutory liquidity ratio and administered interest rates, financial repression
parameters in our model, have negligible e§ects on monetary transmission. This observation
goes against the consensus view on financial repression and monetary transmission in India
(Urjit Patel Committee Report, 2014). A sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the trans-
mission of the monetary base shock measured by the forecast error variance decomposition
and money-output correlation is stronger in response to: (i) a wider spread between the
borrowing and lending rates, (ii) higher price adjustment cost, and (iii) lower degree of retail
inflation indexation. In addition, a higher policy rate inertia, less aggressive inflation target-
ing and less weightage to output stabilization in the policy rule raises the pass-through of
the monetary base shock to output, inflation and the nominal loan rate while it also enhances
monetary transmission of the policy rate.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we report some salient stylized facts
about the output, credit and inflation e§ects of monetary policy shocks. Section 3 lays out
the baseline DSGE model. Section 4 extends this baseline model to include an informal
sector with rule of thumb consumers. In Section 5, we report the quantitative analysis of
the model. Section 6 concludes.
2 Stylized facts
In this section, we present a set of stylized facts based on empirical impulse response plots
of output, credit and inflation with respect to the shocks to monetary policy instruments,
namely monetary base and the policy interest rate, to provide the basis for our theoretical
model. We adopt a sign restricted Structural Vector Autoregression (SRVAR) approach
to identify monetary policy shocks and examine their potential e§ects on key variables to
evaluate the strength of the monetary policy transmission. Our SRVAR approach involves
minimal sign restrictions on the impulse responses of the underlying structural VAR and does
not require more restrictive Cholesky type of exclusion restrictions on the impulse response
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coe¢cients. In the spirit of an agnostic identification procedure proposed by Uhlig (2005),
we identify the shocks to monetary policy instruments and estimate the SRVAR model with
one policy variable at a time.7
2.1 Data and Methodology
We estimate a four variable vector autoregression model comprising the monetary policy
variable, real GDP, consumer price inflation and a credit index over the sample period of
1996:Q4 to 2016:Q4. In Technical Appendix E, we have provided more details on the data
sources and the transformations used for the relevant macroeconomic variables. The choice
of sample period is driven by the availability of the longest possible balanced sample for our
analysis. Besides, the choice of four variables in a SRVAR model is guided by the monetary
policy transmission story of our DSGE model which is premised on the interaction between
inflation and real credit. Except for the monetary policy variables, all other variables are
seasonally adjusted. The series of output and credit are passed through a Baxter and King
(1999) band pass filter in order to capture the real e§ects of a monetary policy shock over
the business cycle frequency.8
In case of the monetary policy variables, the growth rate of money reserves and the 91-
day treasury bill rate are chosen as policy instruments. We consider the 91-day treasury
bill rate as the policy rate for two reasons. First, this is a fairly common approach taken
in the literature (e.g., see Sterk and Tenreyro, 2018; and Lahiri and Patel, 2016). Second,
there is strong empirical evidence suggesting that the transmission from the Repo rate to
the 91-day treasury bill rate is complete and almost instantaneous (Kapur, John and Mitra,
2018; Singh, 2011). Moreover, we find that the correlation between the Repo rate and 91-day
treasury bill rate is 0.78 and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. Hence,
the 91-day treasury bill rate can be considered as a good proxy for the policy rate set by the
RBI.
We impose weaker restrictions on the sign of the impulse response vector of interest. In
our context, this impulse response vector pertains to the monetary policy shock. Following
Uhlig (2005), we remain agnostic about the output e§ect of monetary policy. We also do
not impose any sign restriction on the e§ect of monetary policy shocks on credit. We only
impose a minimal positive sign restriction on the impulse response of inflation to expansion-
7See Kilian and Lutkepohl (2017) for a lucid explanation of the SRVAR approach that we follow here.
8Following Cantelmo and Melina (2018), we take seasonally adjusted series of the macroeconomic variables
namely real output, real credit and CPI inflation. In the spirit of Iacoviello (2005), the real e§ects of monetary
policy shocks are examined with the detrended series of output and credit. We have used the Baxter and
King filter for level variables. The key results of our SRVAR analysis are robust when alternative filtering
procedures such as the Hodrick-Prescott or Christiano-Fitzgerald filtering procedures are used.
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ary monetary policy shock which basically means that an expansionary monetary policy is
inflationary. Table 1, presents our sign restrictions for the relevant variables.
< Insert Table 1 here >
2.2 Key Findings
Figure 1 and 2 report the median impulse responses (blue line) for output, credit and inflation
for money base and policy rate shocks, respectively. Following Uhlig (2005) we provide the
68% probability bands of impulse responses with respect to a 1% increase in the growth rate
of the monetary base and 1% decrease in nominal interest rate from two sets of simulations.
Red lines show the upper and lower limits of these confidence bands.
< Insert Figure 1 and 2 here >
From the IRF plots, we draw the following observations. First, inflation responds to
both shocks positively and appears statistically significant following the impact. Second,
the expansionary response of credit remains statistically significant from the third to tenth
quarter for the money base shock. In case of the interest rate shock, the responsiveness
of credit does not appear to be statistically significant. Finally, the response of output
is statistically significant starting from the period of impact to next eight quarters for the
money base shock. In contrast, for the interest rate shock, it becomes statistically significant
only after the sixth quarter. Further, in terms of the accumulated e§ects of both shocks over
the statistically significant periods of responses, we find that output rises by 2.3% and 1.2%
for the money base and interest rate shock, respectively.9
To summarize, the empirically observed impulse response functions (IRF) reveal that
monetary policy transmission is weak in India if we look at it from the perspective of trans-
mission from the policy rate. However, if we define monetary policy as a change in the
monetary base, there is an improvement in the degree of monetary transmission. Money
base has a significant e§ect on credit and output as evidenced by the confidence bands
around the respective IRF plots. The real e§ects of a money base shock on credit and out-
put are unambiguously higher, more prolonged and persistent compared to an interest rate
shock. This is the key stylized fact which motivates our DSGE modelling for the Indian
economy to which we turn next.
9The dominance of the output e§ect of money base shock over the policy rate shock is a robust finding
which survives also in alternative Cholesky decompositions. The details are available from the authors upon
request.
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3 The Baseline Model
3.1 Environment
There are eight players in the economy: (i) households, (ii) capital goods producing firms,
(iii) intermediate goods firms, (iv) final goods firms, (v) commercial banks, (vi) a postal
deposit sector with the administered interest rate, (vii) government and (viii) the Central
Bank. The representative household consumes final goods, earns wage income from supplying
labour to wholesalers, saves in the form of both commercial bank and other deposits with
administered rates. Wholesale goods firms produce intermediate goods with labour and
capital. Physical capital is produced by capital goods firms who buy old refurbished capital
from the wholesalers and combine this with final goods to produce new capital and sell it
to the wholesalers. Final goods producers costlessly convert wholesale goods to retail goods
and supply these to households, capital goods producers, and the government.
In the financial sector, commercial banks finance the capital spending of the wholesalers
by collecting deposits from households. These banks are subject to a statutory requirement
of holding government bonds and are exposed to an exogenous withdrawal risk which may
necessitate emergency loans from the Central Bank subject to a penalty. The government
owned depository institutions (e.g. post o¢ce) collects a part of household savings and o§ers
an administered interest rate to households.
In the policy block, the Central Bank creates high powered money by injecting bank
reserves. The Central Bank rebates all the nominal proceeds to the government to finance its
exogenous flow of government spending. In addition, the government finances its spending by
taxing households lump sum, using administered deposits from households, and borrowing
from commercial banks by imposing a statutory requirement to hold government bonds.
Figure 3 presents the interactions among the economic agents of the model in a flow chart.
< Insert Figure 3 here >
3.2 Households






βs[U(Ct+s)− Φ(Ht+s) + V (Dt+s/Pt+s, Dat+s/Pt+s)] (1)
which depends on hours worked, Ht, consumption of the final good, Ct, and saving in the
form of risk-free bank and administered deposits, Dt, andDat respectively. Household choices
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must obey the following budget constraint (in nominal terms)
Pt (Ct + Tt) +Dt +D
a
t ≤ WtHt + (1 + i
D








The left hand side of equation (2) represents the flow of expenses which includes current
consumption (where Pt is the aggregate price index and Tt > 0 denote lump-sum taxes),
nominal bank deposits, Dt and nominal administered deposits, Dat . Resources consist of
wage earnings, WtHt, where Wt is the nominal wage rate; payments on deposits made in the
previous period, t− 1, where iDt > 0 is the interest rate on one-period deposits (or savings
contracts) in the banking system; and ia > 0 is the fixed government administered interest
rate on administered account deposits made by households. Πkt is the rebate given back to
households from capital goods firms. Πrt denote nominal profits rebated back from the retail
goods sector, and Πbt are transfers to households from banks.
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Denoting Dt/Pt = dt and Dat /Pt = d
a
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Equation (3) is the Euler equation for real bank deposits. Equation (4) is the Euler equa-
tion for administered deposits which attract the interest rate, ia. Equation (5) is the static
e¢ciency condition for labor supply.11Hereafter, we specialize to the following functional
forms: Φ (Ht) = Ht, U (Ct) = ln (Ct) and V (dt, dat ) = η ln dt + (1− η) ln dat where η 2 (0, 1).
3.3 Capital good producing firms
Perfectly competitive capital goods producing firms solve a problem as in Gertler and Karadi
(2012). The capital goods production function follows the standard law of motion:
Kt = (1− δk)Kt−1 + Zx,tIt (6)
10All derivations are relegated to Technical Appendix A and B.
11In our model, deposits provide liquidity service which is valued by the household and hence its inclusion
in the utility function. This utility specification in our model is functionally equivalent to the Calvo and
Vegh (1995) liquidity-in-advance approach. As a result of this specification, the price level is determinate in
our model. This can be verified by exploiting the property that in our model deposits are proportional to
real balances as shown later. In the steady state, the real balances are uniquely pinned down by the inflation
target which means the price level at date zero is determinate given the initial money stock.
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where It= date t investment, Kt= capital stock at date t, δk= physical rate of constant
depreciation and Zx,t is an investment specific technology (IST) shock which follows an
AR(1) process as given below:



















where κ > 0.
The capital good pricing equation is given by:

























where Qt is the real price of the capital good.
3.4 Final good producing retail firms
Retailers buy intermediate goods at price PWt and package them into final goods and operate
in a monopolistically competitive environment as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
Retailer’s prices (Pt) are sticky and indexed to past and steady state inflation as in Gerali
et al. (2010) based on the indexation parameter θp. If retailers want to change their price
over and above what indexation allows, they have to bear a quadratic price adjustment cost
parameterized by φp.12
The first order condition after imposing a symmetric equilibrium is standard:




























π is the steady state inflation
rate and "Y is the final goods demand elasticity.
12As in any standard New Keynesian model, the nominal rigidity is quite crucial for generating real e§ects
of monetary policy.
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3.5 Wholesale good producing firms
Risk neutral wholesalers produce intermediate goods for the final goods retailers using a




t with 0 < α < 1. The stochastic total factor
productivity (TFP) term At follows an AR(1) process:





where ξAt is an i.i.d shock and A is the steady state level of TFP. These wholsalers borrow
an amount Lt > 0 of loans from commercial banks in order to meet the value of new capital
purchases, QtKt, where Kt is the capital stock. Assuming that all capital spending is debt







where, real loans are given by, lt = LtPt = QtKt. Denoting MPKt+1 as the marginal product



















where PWt is the price of the wholesale good. From equation (10), a rise in πt leads to a
rise in (PWt /Pt) or real marginal costs (since "
Y > 1). Hence, real marginal costs (mc) and
inflation co-move in the same direction which is the cornerstone of NK inflation-real mc
channel. We show later that monetary policy has real e§ects through an interction between
this inflation-real mc and the credit channel because in equilibrium real loans QtKt rise in
response to a higher inflation.
3.6 Banks
The representative bank maximizes cash flows by o§ering savings contracts (deposits) and
borrowing contracts (loans). The banking sector is assumed to be competitive.13 Banks
are required to keep reserves with the Central Bank. In India, and many other emerging
market economies (EMEs), banks are also constrained to buy government debt from deposit
inflows as mandated by a statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) that pays them an interest rate
13Banks are assumed to be perfectly competitive for simplicity as in Eggertsson et al. (2017). In some
papers in the literature, such as in Gerali et al. (2010), market power in the banking industry is modelled
using a Dixit-Stiglitz framework for retail credit and deposit markets. Our preliminary analysis with such
an extended model shows that the key results of our paper are una§ected by this extension.
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iGt which is treated as a policy rate.
14 In every period, following Chang et al. (2014), we
assume that banks face a stochastic withdrawal of deposits at the end of each period, t. At
date t, if the withdrawal (say ]Wt−1) exceeds bank reserves (cash in vault), banks fall back
on the Central Bank for emergency loans at the penalty rate ip > 0.15 Banks pay back
the emergency borrowing to the Central Bank at the end of the period. This withdrawal
uncertainty necessitates a demand for excess reserves by banks.
Define iLt to be the interest rate on loans, Lt−1, i
R to be the fixed interest rate on reserves,
MRt , mandated by the Central Bank, and fWt is the stochastic withdrawal. We assume that
bank has a SLR equal to αq 2 [0, 1].
The bank’s cash flow at date t can be rewritten as:
Πbt = (1 + i
L
t )Lt−1 + (1 + i
R)MRt−1 + αq(1 + i
G
t )Dt−1| {z }
SLR on last period’s deposits
− (1 + iDt )Dt−1| {z }
Cost of funds of last period’s deposits
(14)
− (1 + ip − iDt )χt(]Wt−1 −M
R
t−1, 0)− (1− χt)]Wt−1 + Dt|{z}
Current deposits
− αqDt| {z }
SLR this period
− Lt −MRt
where χt is an indicator function which is unity if fWt−1−MRt−1 > 0 and zero otherwise. At
date t, banks make decisions about loans (Lt) and reserves (MRt ) after observing the deposit
(Dt). On the other hand, depositors could partially withdraw their deposit randomly at the
end of the period.16 This basically provides a motivation to banks to hold excess reserves
as in Chang et al. (2013). The first two terms on the right hand side of equation (14)
correspond to the interest earned in time t on loans disbursed in time t − 1, and interest
on reserves in the previous period, MRt−1. Since the bank is required to hold government
debt as a constant fraction, αq, of incoming deposits, αq(1 + iGt )Dt−1, denotes the interest
earnings on SLR debt holdings by banks. As described above, banks also face a penalty, at
14We choose iGt as a proxy for the policy rate for two reasons. First, changes in Repo rate transmit to
both short rates (like the overnight call money rate) and longer duration (i.e., 91 day) money market rates
almost instantaneously. Second, and more fundamentally, a change in iGt a§ects the costs of funds facing
commercial banks. The main such cost is the deposit rate. The impact e§ect of a rise in the policy rate is a
higher cost of funds facing these banks through the imperfect pass-through to the deposit rate after netting
out SLR. This will be seen later from the cash flow equation (16).
15Banks can borrow from the RBI for additional liquidity (over and above their Repo borrowings) at the
Marginal Standing Facility (MSF) rate, which is currently 25 basis points higher than the Repo rate. This
can be viewed as a "penalty" rate. See, also footnote 4 for the description of the MSF.
16We do not model here the withdraw decision of households and assume that the withdrawal, fWt is a
random i.i.d. process and it cannot exceed deposits. This basically rules out a sudden stop of the economy
with a full bank run. This random withdrawal makes the cash flow of the bank risky. This cash flow is
ploughed back as a transfer (TRt) to the household.
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a constant rate, ip > 0, for stochastic withdrawals over and above their bank reserves. The
penalty amount is (1 + ip − iDt )(]Wt−1 −MRt−1) which nets out the interest payment of banks
to depositors who withdraw early. We assume that banks o§er a deposit rate, iDt , which is
a mark-down of the interest rate that it receives on government bonds, iGt . In other words,
1 + iDt = ζ(1 + i
G
t ) (15)
where 0 < ζ < 1. The parameter ζ proxies the imperfect pass through of the policy rate (iGt )
to the deposit rate.17 We do not model the mark-down, ζ, but calibrate it. We can rewrite
the cash flow in equation (14) as:18
Πbt = (1 + i
L
t )Lt−1 + (1 + i
R)MRt−1 − (ζ − αq)(1 + i
G
t )Dt−1 (16)
− (1 + ip − iDt )χt(]Wt−1 −M
R
t−1, 0)− (1− χt)]Wt−1
+ (1− αq)Dt − Lt −MRt
The representative bank maximizes discounted cash flows in two stages. It first solves for its










subject to the statutory reserve requirement:









is the inflation adjusted stochastic discount factor.
The Euler equation is given by:
EtΩt,t+1
"





+ λbt = 1 (18)
The first term in the square bracket in equation (18) is the bank’s interest income from
reserves. The second term is the expected saving of penalty because of holding more re-
serves. λbt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the reserve constraint (17). Assuming
17The imperfect pass-through from the policy rate to deposit rate is motivated by the Urjit Patel committee
report of RBI and other policy papers (e.g. RBI, 2014, Das, 2015) which suggest that the deposit rate
sluggishly responds to surprise policy rate changes.
18Note that a higher policy rate iGt lowers the cash flow of the banks because the observed ζ > αq. This
adverse cash flow e§ect is at the heart of the policy rate transmission which will be seen later.
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a rectangular distribution for withdrawal over [0, Dt], real reserve demand relative to deposit




1− (1 + iR)EtΩt,t+1
(1 + ip − iDt+1)EtΩt,t+1
(19)
where xt = MRt /Pt and dt = Dt/Pt. It is straightforward to verify that given the stochastic
discount factor, Ωt,t+1, a higher iR or ip means a higher MRt as expected. In addition, a
higher deposit rate subsidizes the penalty imposed on the bank due to excess withdrawal
of deposits because banks do not have to pay interest on this early withdrawal of deposits.
Thus, banks hold fewer precautionary reserves relative to deposits.
Once the bank’s reserve demand problem is solved, we next turn to optimal loan dis-
bursement. Note that the bank solves a recursive problem of choosing Lt+s given Lt+s−1
which was chosen in the previous period. This is a dynamic allocation problem which gives
the following loan Euler equation:19




The Central Bank follows a simple money supply rule. It lets the monetary base (MBt ), or




















where ρµ is the policy smoothing coe¢cient and ξ
µ
t is the money supply shock, which follows
an AR (1) process. We view a shock to the monetary base as an autonomous liquidity shock.
Money market equilibrium implies that
19A steady state borrowing-lending spread exists in this model because deposit appears in the utility
function and provides a liquidity service (convenience yield) to the household. Bank deposit provides some
transaction utility to the household. Thus the household wishes that the banks do not loan out all their
deposits which would make them illiquid. This convenience yield (alternatively a liquidity premium) gives
rise to a positive borrowing-lending spread in the steady state. To see this, combine (3) and (20) to get the
following steady state borrowing-lending spread:














t for all t.
Such a money supply process imposes a restriction on the short run growth rate of real













Since real reserves are proportional to deposits as shown in the bank’s reserve demand
function, (19), this money supply process also imposes a restriction on the dynamics of
deposits, interest rate on loans, and consumption.
3.8 Interest rate policy
As discussed in Section 2, the short term interest rate on government bonds (iGt ) can be
interpreted as the policy rate. We give it an inflation targeting Taylor rule as follows:



























The parameters 'π > 0 , and 'y > 0 are the inflation, and output gap sensitivity parameters
in the Taylor Rule. Yt denotes GDP, and therefore YtY denotes the output gap. ρiG is the
interest rate smoothing term and ξi
G
t is the policy rate shock.
Our model departs from standard New Keynesian model in an important way. It allows
both the policy rate ( iGt ) and the money supply (M
B
t ) to be two independent monetary
policy tools. While the Central Bank follows a simple money supply rule, and the short
term government bond rate (i.e., the policy rate) follows a Taylor rule, both variables are
not simultaneously endogenous. Base money shocks, by impacting inflation, raise interest
rates via the Taylor rule. Money market equilibrium is restored from equation (19) via the
stochastic discount factor (since iR and ip are constant) and adjustment of the deposit rate
via the mark down rule in equation (15). On the other hand, shocks to the policy rate
in equation (23), given price stickiness, impacts output through the standard NK channel.
Since the monetary base is exogenous, the change in the policy rate has no e§ect on the
monetary base.20 We shall see later in the quantitative analysis section that the strength of
20In the standard New Keynesian model (Gali, 2008), interest rate is the principal policy tool. The Central
Bank exploits an ad-hoc transaction money demand function to accommodate any policy rate shock. In our




monetary transmission of a money base shock is sensitive to the parameters of the Taylor
rule.
3.9 Fiscal policy














where Gt corresponds to real government purchases, and Bt denotes the stock of public
debt. The left hand side of equation (24) denotes total expenditure by the government
(nominal government purchases + interest payments on public debt + interest rates on
reserves + interest payments at administered rate on postal deposits).21 The right hand
side of equation (24) denotes the total resources available to the government (nominal lump
sum taxes + new debt + new reserves + administered deposits + interest payments from
withdrawal penalties). The government makes a forecast of the penalty revenue that it will
generate at the end of date t. Once the actual penalty income is realized, there could be a
forecast error in the government’s prediction of penalty income. Given a mandated level of
government spending, the government has to adjust taxes to such a prediction error. For
example, if the penalty income is under-predicted, the government would end up taxing the
household less.22
Government spending (or government purchases) evolves stochastically according to:







ξGt denotes the shock to government spending, and follows an AR(1) process.
Since fiscal policy is not the focus of our paper, we have kept this building block in
our model very simple. The government pre-commits to an exogenous path of government
spending. The government issues only enough debt to finance the SLR holdings of banks. In
Bank has to let bank reserves grow at
−
π to sustain the steady state equilibrium. The Central Bank can
perturb this steady state equilibrium in the short run either by a policy rate shock (ξi
G
t ) or a monetary base
shock (ξµt ). In the case of the former, there is a short run equilibrating change in inflation which keeps the
money market in equilibrium. In case of the latter, the policy rate (iGt ) adjusts via the Taylor rule when
inflation responds immediately to a monetary base shock. Thus, both the monetary base and the policy rate
can be used as independent controls unlike the standard New Keynesian model.
21We think of the government as a combined fiscal-monetary entity.
22Alternatively, we can formulate the government budget constraint by making the penalty revenue state
dependent which also means adjustment of lump taxes in the state when the government does not earn
penalty revenue. Neither of these two specifications has any e§ect on the households’ first order conditions.
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this respect, government bonds are endogenously determined by the time paths of deposits.
In addition, the government has to finance interest on excess reserves and administered
deposits, and the predicted surplus/shortage of penalty revenue predicted in advance. The
only instrument for financing all these is a lump sum tax, Tt. Because of the lump-sum
nature of the taxes, it has no distortionary e§ects on the economy.23
4 Extended model: Informal sector with rule of thumb
(RT ) consumers
In our baseline model, there is no transaction demand for money. Bank deposits play the
role of money in this setting. This could be viewed as an over-simplification while modelling
the Indian economy and other EMDEs, where a vast section of the population is in the
informal sector uses cash as a medium of transaction. In this section, we extend the model
to add a transaction demand for money and allow for segmented labor markets. We change
the risk neutral wholesale producers hiring workers from two groups of households: (i) who
supply labor as a credit good and, (ii) rule of thumb (RT ) unbanked workers who supply
labor as cash goods. The proportion of RT consumer in the household sector is assumed
to be φ 2 [0, 1] . Thus, the labor markets are segmented with proportions of φ and (1− φ)
types of RT and Ricardian consumers, respectively. To pay the first group of workers, the
wholesaler needs to carry over some cash. Note that since wholesalers carry over cash, his
problem must be dynamic as opposed to the static problem in Section 3.5. The dynamic


























where all symbols are the same as before, Lt is the new nominal loan andMTt is non-interest
bearing cash (di§erent from interest bearing bank reserve MRt ), and Y
W
t is subject to the
same production function as in the baseline model. λ
/
t is an inflation adjusted discount
factor which will be specified later. New notations here are HRTt , H
F
t which are the labor
demanded from RT and forward looking households, respectively. The production function




t + (1 − φ)HFt )1−α. These two types of labor (which come in
the proportion, φ/(1−φ)) are assumed to be perfectly substitutable. Their wages, however,
23As in Smets and Wouters (2007), we assume that government spending is exogenous. Endogenizing
government spending by bringing an automatic stabilizer could make the real e§ect of a policy rate stronger
but is beyond the scope of this paper.
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are not the same because of the payment friction for the RT group.24 The labor market is
segmented because a group of workers are unbanked and want cash for work. Their wage
will be subject to an inflation tax while for banked workers, no such inflation tax appears.
Wholesale producers are subject to a borrowing constraint as follows:
PtQtKt ≤ Lt (26)
We assume that this borrowing constraint binds. Since wholesalers have to pay the rule of






In this extended model with RT consumers and a cash in advance constraint given by
(27), we get two labour demand functions facing the risk neutral wholesaler. These are given



















t /Pt) = 0 (29)
Since the wage bill is subject to the last period cash constraint, the real wage is subject to
an inflation tax. Hiring a worker today also entails use of cash available today, which means
less cash available for wage disbursement tomorrow, hence, the discounting of the marginal
product of labor.
4.1 Labor supply of RT and Ricardian households
RT, or unbanked consumers, solve the following static maximization problem:









which gives rise to the following labor supply function of RT consumers:
U 0(C
RT
t )(Wt/Pt) = Φ
0(HRTt ) (30)
24Thus, the usual labor mobility story does not apply here.
25See Technical Appendix C for derivations of the extended model.
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It is easy to verify that with the utility function lnCRTt −HRTt , the optimal labor supply of
RT consumers is given by:
HRTt = 1 (31)






4.2 Labor market equilibrium
Because of segmented labor markets arising due to a payment friction in the RT sector, two
real wages will prevail in equilibrium. In Technical Appendix C, we show how this happens
in a steady state equilibrium.
4.3 Government budget constraint
The government now has seigniorage as an additional source of revenue because of the use
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t + (1 + i
p)Etmax(fWt −MRt , 0) (32)
4.4 Monetary policy

























The objective of our quantitative analysis is to understand why monetary transmission is
weak in India using the baseline and extended models. We refer to the baseline model
as ‘Model 1’ and its extended version with the presence of an unbanked population and
segmented labor markets as ‘Model 2’. As mentioned at the outset, we define monetary
transmission as the real e§ect (particularly, the output e§ect) of monetary policy. We focus
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on the conventional instruments of monetary policy used by an inflation targeting Cen-
tral Bank. These policy instruments are the money base and the short term interest rate
(which is the government bond rate in our model). The magnitude of transmission of the
shocks is measured using the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) results of key
macroeconomic variables of the model. In our analysis, we specify the baseline parameteri-
zation of the model and calibrate the shock structure to match empirical moments. We then
report the variance decomposition results and sensitivity experiments with structural and
policy parameters, and explain the impulse response properties of the baseline and extended
model.
5.1 Calibration
Following the extant DSGE literature on India and using Indian data for our macroeconomic
variables, we calibrate the structural and policy parameters of our models. The share of
capital in the production process is set as 0.3 (Banerjee and Basu, 2019). The discount factor
is taken as 0.98 (Gabriel et al., 2012). Household’s preference for holding bank deposits
is calibrated based on the share of commercial bank deposits to total deposits which is
approximately 84%. Depreciation of physical capital is chosen as 2.5% on a quarterly basis.
The investment adjustment cost parameter is set to 2 from Banerjee and Basu (2019). The
mark down factor, ζ, for the deposit interest rate is taken as 0.97 in order to match the savings
account deposit rate at the steady state of 3.8%. The price adjustment cost parameter is
taken as 118 from Anand et al. (2010) and indexation of past inflation is set to 58% following
Sahu (2013). For the extended model, the proportion of rule of thumb consumers in the
population is set to 35% as estimated by Gabriel et al. (2012).
We set policy parameters for the Taylor rule stabilizer following Gabriel et al. (2012)
and Banerjee and Basu (2019), where the interest rate smoothing coe¢cient is 0.66, inflation
stabilizing coe¢cient is 1.2 and output gap stabilizing coe¢cient is 0.5. The long run inflation
target is set to 4% as proposed by the Urjit Patel Committee Report of RBI (2014). The
steady state value of the policy rate is set to 6.875% in line with the time-average over the
period of inflation targeting in India. As of March 2019, the statutory liquidity requirement
of the commercial banks is 19.25%, and the value of αq is set accordingly. The government
administered interest rate is set to 4% as observed from the savings account rates in the
Indian Postal Service. The steady state value of the penalty rate is chosen to be 7.5%,
which is the time-average of the marginal standing facility (MSF) rate in the LAF corridor.
The steady state value of productivity and policy shocks are normalized to one. Table 2
summarizes the baseline values of the structural and policy parameters.
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< Insert Table 2 here >
For the baseline parameterization of the exogenous shock processes, we follow a method
of moments approach. In Technical Appendix E, we have provided the list of relevant
macroeconomic and financial variables and the method of data transformation used in order
to make the empirical moments comparable with the theoretical moments of interest. We
target nine moments from the data and calibrate nine unknown parameters of shock processes
in order to match the observed moments.26 Having done this, we then examine how some
relevant over-identified moments (which we call non-targeted moments) from the model
compare with the data. Our nine targets are three volatility targets, namely, (i) standard
deviations of output, inflation and the lending rate, and (ii) six cross-correlation targets,
namely, correlations of output with consumption, investment, bank deposits, correlation
of the lending rate with inflation, and correlations of the administered deposits with the
policy interest rate and bank lending rate. For the volatilities, output and CPI inflation
are considered to be the primary objectives for inflation targeting Central Banks. The
bank lending rate is the key variable for transmitting monetary impulses. In case of cross-
correlations, we choose targets according to the strengths of statistical significance. All the
correlations are significant at 5% level of significance.
Table 3 summarizes the baseline values of all the second moment parameters of the
shock processes. The calibrated shock parameters are broadly in line with the data and the
relevant literature. For instance, the first order persistence and standard error of TFP (0.82
and 0.016, respectively) and fiscal policy (0.59 and 0.026, respectively) shocks are close to
the estimates provided by Anand et al. (2010). For the IST shock, the values for the AR (1)
coe¢cient and standard error (0.63 and 0.133, respectively) are in line with the estimates of
Banerjee and Basu (2019). In case of the autonomous shock to money base, our calibrated
numbers for the persistence coe¢cient and standard error (0.32 and 0.042, respectively) fits
fairly well with the estimates of the AR(1) coe¢cient and standard error of the growth rate
of real reserves. The standard error of the policy rate shock is set to 0.002 in line with the
estimate of Anand et al. (2010).
< Insert Table 3 here >
26There are four shock processes with two parameters to calibrate for each. The error term in the interest
rate process is however i.i.d., meaning that only one parameter, i.e., the standard deviation of the shock
needs to be calibrated for this equation. In sum, we have nine parameters related to the shock structure of
the model.
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5.2 Model validation by matching moments
While targeting nine business cycle statistics to minimize the di§erence between empiri-
cal and theoretical moments, we subsequently check if this exercise can produce a reliable
baseline parameterization of the model. In order to do this, we compare the non-targeted
moments of the business cycle properties of Indian data and our baseline model. Our model
is validated over the sample period of 1996:Q4 to 2016:Q4. Sources and treatments with
the data for analysis are provided in the Technical Appendix E of the paper. Tables 4 and
5 report the data and model comparison for Model 1 and 2 with respect to targeted and
non-targeted moments.27
< Insert Table 4 and 5 here >
The output and lending rate volatilities are quite accurately predicted by both models in
terms of the respective standard deviations. Inflation volatility is somewhat under-predicted.
For the non-targeted moments, the model generated first order persistence coe¢cients of out-
put, inflation and real loans are in line with their data counterparts. The cross-correlations in
both models predict the signs correctly. All model generated non-targeted second moments
are in the 95% confidence bands of the data counterparts. A few important observations
should be noted. First, the correlation between output and monetary base growth is positive
in both the data and our model which is indicative of monetary transmission emanating from
changes in the monetary base. Second, the correlation between the policy rate and the lend-
ing rate is strongly positive in the data (0.68) and predicted reasonably by the model (0.58).
One may be tempted to conclude from this observation that the credit channel of monetary
transmission is strong. However, the correlation between the policy rate and output shows
a di§erent picture. It is positive in the data (0.34) and model (0.25) which goes contrary to
the conventional Taylor rule based wisdom that a lower policy rate would raise output.28
Regarding the interpretation of cross-correlation results, an important caveat is in order.
This moment matching exercise essentially gives us a broad guidance of how the model
performs in matching India’s business cycle statistics. One cannot necessarily infer the
27Note that the definition of monetary base is di§erent between Model 1 and Model 2. In Model 1,
the monetary base just equals the bank reserve while in Model 2 it includes bank reserve and currency in
circulation. Thus, for model validation, we use reserve money as the monetary base for Model 1. For Model
2, we consider both interest bearing reserves and non-interest bearing cash in the definition of monetary
base. For this reason, correlations of [Y, (xt/xt−1)] and [d, (xt/xt−1)] are marginally di§erent between Table
4 and Table 5.
28We have also computed the same second moments using di§erent filtering procedures such as the Hodrick-
Prescott and Christiano-Fitzgerald symmetric filters. We find that the empirical second moments used for the
purpose of model calibration are reasonably robust across di§erent filtering procedures since they mostly lie
within a 95% confidence interval of the BK-filter based empirical moments. The details of these computations
are available from the authors upon request.
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degree of monetary transmission or the e¢cacy of the credit channel of monetary policy
by looking at these cross-correlations alone. The reason is that these correlations represent
reduced form relationships and reflect co-movement of two series in response to all five shocks
driving the economy. Hence, even if the correlation between the policy rate and output goes
against the conventional Taylor rule wisdom, it does not necessarily tell us that monetary
transmission is weak. For doing a comprehensive analysis, one needs to look at the variance
decomposition of output with respect to the monetary base and policy rate shocks to which
we turn now.
5.3 Variance decomposition results from baseline model
Table 6 reports the forecast error variance decomposition results of the key variables with
respect to five fundamental shocks for both models. For Model 1, it is found that monetary
policy shocks (adding both autonomous money base shocks and shocks to the short term
policy rate) explain approximately 21% of output fluctuations in which the monetary base
accounts for 20%. The lion’s share (45.11%) of output fluctuations is explained by the
shock to total factor productivity as argued in the literature (Banerjee and Basu, 2019). In
addition, government spending shocks make a significant contribution to cyclical variations
(31.49%) in output. Inflation (50.80%) and the bank lending rate (49.20%) are also largely
driven by the shocks to total factor productivity.
< Insert Table 6 here >
A similar pattern in the variance decomposition is also observed for Model 2 along with
a new feature. The relative importance of monetary policy shocks in output fluctuations
declines to around 16% while the fiscal policy shock (35.91%) becomes more important
compared to Model 1. The presence of an unbanked population chokes o§ the channels of
pass-through of monetary transmission to aggregate demand. Since non-Ricardian house-
holds are present, the impact of fiscal spending shock on output fluctuations is amplified.
5.4 Sensitivity experiments for monetary transmission
In Table 7, we present the results of sensitivity experiments which are conducted for a variety
of structural and policy parameters of Models 1 and 2. We decrease the baseline values of
these parameters one at a time by 10%. We then check how such a perturbation a§ects the
transmission of autonomous shocks to the monetary base and the policy rate compared to
baseline values.
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< Insert Table 7 here >
A few observations are in order. In the banking sector, a change in the preference parame-
ter for commercial bank deposit holding (η), changes in the financial repression parameter,
αq (the SLR requirement) and ia (the administered interest rate) have a negligible impact
on monetary transmission. On the nominal front, lower price adjustment costs (φp) and a
higher degree of inflation indexation (θp) in the retail sector make monetary transmission
weaker. Not surprisingly, a lower nominal friction and the lack of forward looking price
setting behavior limits the real e§ects of a monetary policy shock.
On the monetary policy front, the parameter (ζ) determining the pass-through of the
policy rate to deposit rate in (15) has a major implication for monetary transmission driven
by the money base. The transmission of the monetary base shock becomes conspicuously
higher (61.05%) as seen from the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) and money-
output correlation while the transmission of the interest rate shock is remarkably diminished.
The intuition for this stems from the fact that a lower ζ marks down the interest rate on
deposits which discourages the household to accumulate bank deposits. Since reserve demand
is proportional to bank deposits (see equation (19)), banks hold fewer reserves in proportion
to deposit and extend more loans which strengthens the credit channel. Thus the propagation
of a monetary base shock becomes stronger through the bank lending channel because banks
hold less reserves. On the other hand, since a lower ζ widens the spread (iLt − iDt ), and iLt is
largely determined by inflation, the pass-through from a policy rate shock to the bank lending
rate (iLt ) becomes weaker which explains why the policy rate accounts for less variation in
output.
The interest rate smoothing coe¢cient (ρiG) in Taylor rule has a noteworthy implication
for monetary transmission. A lower ρiG significantly reduces monetary transmission of the
policy rate as evidenced by the variance decomposition of output. The policy rate accounts
for 0.62% as opposed to 1% of output variation when the smoothing coe¢cient drops. The
lower response of output is due to the lower degree of persistent variation in the interest rate
in response to a policy shock which translates into less persistent output fluctuations. Finally,
not surprisingly, less aggressive inflation targeting (lower 'π) and less output stabilization
(lower 'y) raises the pass-through of a monetary base shock to output. The result of the
sensitivity experiments remains fairly similar for Model 2.
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5.5 Impulse response analysis of the monetary transmission mech-
anism
We next study the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the relevant macroeconomic variables
with respect to shocks to the monetary base and policy rate. Figures 4 and 5 plot the IRFs
of a monetary base shock (ξµt ) and a policy rate shock (ξ
iG
t ). All the IRFs are measured as
percent deviation from the steady state.
< Insert Figures 4 and 5 here >
5.5.1 E§ect of a shock to monetary base
Starting from the steady state with constant real reserves and inflation, a positive shock to
ξµt immediately impacts inflation πt via the monetary base rule in equation (22). Higher
inflation transmits to a higher real marginal cost (PW/P ) following the staggered price
adjustment cost equation (10). This is where the standard New Keynesian staggered price-
setting mechanism starts having a real e§ect on the economy. A higher real marginal cost
makes firms expand output and employment because the value of the marginal product
of capital and labour schedules shift out which raises the equilibrium real wage. Such an
expansion in the economy via a wealth e§ect raises consumption. The nominal interest rate
on deposits rises because the Central Bank adjusts the policy rate upward in response to
inflation which passes through to a higher deposit rate via the mark down rule in equation
(15).
On the banking front, several equilibrating adjustments take place. Bank loans rise to
accommodate this expansion which also explains higher investment. Tobin’s Q rises because
of higher investment via equation (9). Bank reserves also rise following the bank reserve
equation (19) because households increase their holding of bank deposits lured by a higher
deposit rate. This also means a substitution of deposits from the administered sector to the
banking sector which explains why postal deposits fall. The nominal interest rate on loans
rises in equilibrium due to higher inflation via the bank’s loan Euler equation (20). Such a
rise in the nominal loan rate resembles a Fisher e§ect. A positive shock to the monetary
base thus has an unambiguously stimulative e§ect on the economy.
5.5.2 E§ect of a shock to policy interest rate
A negative shock to the policy interest rate, iGt directly passes through to a lower deposit
rate iDt via (15). Households reshuffle their deposits away from commercial bank deposits to
administered rate accounts (dat ) for a relatively higher return. This explains why real bank
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deposits fall. Lower bank deposits spill over to lower real bank reserves through the bank
reserve demand function (19). Since the Central Bank has not changed the stock of reserves,
MBt is fixed at date t. Thus, lower real bank reserves means a discrete rise in the price
level, Pt, which means πt rises. However, this rise in inflation is considerably lower than the
case of a positive shock to monetary base. Following this, the conventional New Keynesian
inflation-real mc relationship makes real output rise on impact. The expansionary e§ect of
a lower policy rate is, however, noticeably weaker than positive base money shock. Bank
loans also make equilibrating adjustments to this weaker expansion. Bank deposits go down,
which translates to lower bank reserves but the reserve/deposit ratio rises contributing to
a weak credit channel. The nominal interest rate on loan rises in impact as in the case of
a base money shock reflecting the Fisher e§ect. Note that by construction the monetary
base does not change in this policy experiment (see eq (21)) and thus does not respond to
a shock to the policy rate. The remaining impulses are the same as in the case of a money
base shock although the e§ects are quantitatively smaller.
5.5.3 Strength of the credit channel
To get a sense of loan disbursement under both policy instruments, Figure 6 plots the
equilibrium real loan, lt which is equal to QtKt by definition. The real loan rises in response
to a positive money shock and a lower policy rate shock. It is noticeable that the rise in
loans is at least as twice as high in case of a money base shock compared to a policy rate
shock. From the FEVD results of Table 6, it can be observed that the money base shock
explains nearly 17% of the fluctuations in real credit while the interest rate shock explains
only about 0.9% of the same. Such results show that the money base shock can drive the
credit channel with a greater strength compared to an interest rate shock. This happens
because inflation rises more in the case of a money base shock, leading to a stronger e§ect on
output via the NK real mc-inflation channel. A lower policy rate raises the reserve-deposit
(xt/dt) ratio, while it lowers the reserve-deposit ratio in the case of a money shock. This
further reinforces the e§ects of the money shock on real loans.
< Insert Figure 6 here >
5.5.4 Implications
Two important observations are noteworthy from these two policy simulations. First, a
combination of a credit channel and the standard New Keynesian inflation-real mc channel
is at work in characterizing the monetary transmission mechanism of two types of monetary
policy shocks. Both channels complement each other and pin down the pass-through from
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inflation to output. However, the New Keynesian sticky price channel is quite fundamental.
Absent price stickiness, the real e§ect of monetary policy disappears.29 Second, the com-
parison of output impulse responses of the monetary base versus policy rate shocks reveals
that the output response is much more pronounced and prolonged for a positive shock to
the monetary base as opposed to the interest rate. The impact e§ect on output with respect
to a monetary base shock is significantly bigger than the output response with respect to a
negative policy rate shock. In addition, the positive output e§ect lasts more than 20 quarters
for a monetary base shock, while for the interest rate shock, it dissipates after 11 quarters.
Such di§erences between the output e§ects of a monetary base and interest rate shock is
partly due to the fact that the money base shock dominates its interest rate counterpart in
explaining the variations in real credit.
The punch-line of our exercise is that a shock to the monetary base has a far stronger
and persistent e§ect on output than a shock to the policy interest rate. This agrees well
with the empirical SRVAR impulse responses reported in Section 2.
5.6 Robustness checks for the size of monetary policy shocks
The upshot of the variance decomposition and impulse response analysis is that the output
e§ect of a shock to the monetary base dominates the same e§ect of a policy rate change. One
may wonder whether the superior output e§ects of a monetary base shock compared to a
policy shock is due to the calibrated size of the shocks of monetary base vis-a-vis the policy
rate. To investigate this further, we do a robustness check of the standard error of each
shock. We consider the mean squared error (MSE) as a measure of the goodness of fit of our
model, and compute the same from the di§erence between theoretical and empirical impulse
responses of output with respect to each type of monetary policy shock. We take the median
output impulse response functions reported in Figure 1 and 2 as the empirical benchmarks,
and compare them with the relevant model generated output impulse response functions in
order to calculate the baseline MSE for the money base and interest rate shocks. For the
baseline parameterization, the MSEs of money base and interest rate shocks are 4.4E-06
and 3.2E-06, respectively. We find that the MSE of impulse responses rises if the standard
deviation of the (i) money base shock falls and (ii) policy rate shock rises from their baseline
values. Based on this sensitivity analysis, we take the position that the calibrated sizes of
the money base and interest rate shocks are optimal in terms of predicting the observed
29It is straightforward to verify that shutting down the staggered pricing (i.e., φp equals to zero) completely
eliminates the real marginal cost channel of inflation. Monetary policy then turns out to be neutral. Details
of the flexible price IRF dynamics are available from the authors upon request.
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output impulse response functions.30
5.7 Impulse response analysis of extended model
We now turn to the impulse response analysis of Model 2 which has an important feature,
namely, the inclusion of rule of thumb (RT ) consumers residing in an unbanked sector. The
monetary transmission channel for the extended model is similar to the baseline model except
that an inflationary monetary policy has a weaker real e§ect than our baseline model.31 This
happens because a positive inflation tax lowers the consumption of the RT consumers. The
sketch of monetary transmission mechanisms of the two monetary policy shocks is outlined
in Table 8.
< Insert Table 8 here >
Notice that for both policy shocks, the transmission channels (a) and (b) shown in Table
8 are the same as in the baseline model. The only new feature is that a higher inflation
has an adverse wealth e§ect on the RT consumers because their real wage is subject to the
cash-in-advance constraint equation (27). Such an adverse wealth e§ect is not su§ered by
the forward looking (F) consumers. Figure 7 demonstrates this further by comparing the
consumption responses of RT and F consumers. The RT consumers su§er a sharp drop
in consumption in response to either form of monetary stimulus while the forward looking
consumers experience a rise in consumption. Two countervailing e§ects are at work here.
The first is the inflation tax and the second is the output e§ect. The inflation tax lowers the
real wage of RT consumers which lowers their consumption immediately. The subsequent rise
in consumption occurs due to a sharp rise in output through the inflation-real mc channel
mentioned earlier. This positive output e§ect explains why RT consumers experience a
higher consumption in the second period.
< Insert Figure 7 and 8 here >
The negative consumption e§ect of RT consumers dampens monetary transmission from
the demand side as seen by the weak impact e§ect of an easy monetary policy. This is
demonstrated in Figure 8. Figure 8A compares the output responses of a positive money
30We have also performed other robustness checks on the dominance of monetary base shocks. When we
shut down both auto-correlations by setting ρiG = ρµ = 0, the FEVD of output with respect to an interest
rate shock reduces to zero making money shocks unambiguously dominate over the interest rate shock in
determining output variation. Money base shock still contributes in the FEVD of output by 9.11%. When
we shut o§ only the auto-correlation coe¢cient in the money base shock, the role of the interest rate shock
improves marginally, but the dominance of the money base shock remains unaltered.
31The details of the impulse responses of Model 2 are presented in Technical Appendix D.
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base shock between Model 1 and Model 2, and Figure 8B does the same for a negative
policy interest rate shock. Regarding the impact e§ect, as it is evident from Figure 8A, an
expansionary money base shock raises output in both models (0.31% and 0.23% in Model 1
and Model 2, respectively) but much less in Model 2. From the second period, output rises
discretely in Model 2 and then declines. The capital stock is predetermined in the first period
of the shock while aggregate employment rises less than Model 1 because the employment of
RT consumers is fixed at unity by construction. This feeble rise in employment translates
into a weak impact on output in the first period of the monetary shock in Model 2 compared
to Model 1. From the second period, real marginal cost-inflation channel sets in motion.
From date 3 onward output starts reverting to the mean. On the whole, computing the
accumulated e§ects of a money base shock over the time horizon of five years, we find that
the output e§ect is trimmed down from 2.46% in Model 1 to 2.17% in Model 2.
The response of output to a negative interest rate shock is similar to a money base shock
but quantitatively less pronounced as shown in Figure 8B. The accumulated output e§ect of
an interest rate shock over a period of five year turns out to be 0.27% in Model 1 and 0.26%
in Model 2.
5.8 Banking sector frictions and RT consumers: A comparative
analysis of the impediments to monetary transmission
Using the lens of the augmented model (Model 2), we find that there are two crucial frictions
which could be a challenge for the monetary transmission mechanism. These are banking
sector related frictions and the presence of unbanked RT consumers. Which one poses
a greater obstacle to monetary transmission for an emerging market economy like India?
We do a comparative analysis among the relevant structural parameters using the baseline
parameterization of Model 2. We focus on four parameters, namely, the administered interest
rate (ia), SLR of the commercial bank (αq), preference for holding commercial bank deposit
(η) and proportion of the rule of thumb consumers (φ) in the labour market. The first three
parameters represent banking sector frictions while the last one identifies RT consumers,
which is a financial friction. We perturb the baseline values of the above parameters by
50 percent and measure the changes in monetary policy transmission from three indicators:
(i) changes in share of each type of monetary policy shock in the FEVD of real output
(y); (ii) impact e§ect (I.E.) of real output with respect to each type of monetary policy
shocks; and (iii) correlation between real output and each type of policy instrument. The
results are presented in Tables 9 and 10. It is noteworthy that the banking sector related
frictions emerge as negligible factors in explaining weak monetary transmission. In contrast,
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the increase in the presence of RT consumers in the labour market plays a nontrivial role
in determining the degree of monetary policy transmission irrespective of the choice of the
policy instrument.
< Insert Table 9 and 10 here >
To investigate further how much of the di§erence in strength of monetary transmission is
accounted by the presence of RT consumers, we consider an extreme case when there is no
RT consumers (φ = 0), keeping the remaining baseline parameters unchanged. Under this
condition, we shock both the policy instruments and measure the changes of transmission
indicators. The key prediction of the model regarding the relative importance of money
base shock over interest rate shock remains unaltered. However, it is observed that: (a)
contributions of the monetary base shock and interest rate shock to aggregate output improve
almost equally (by 32% and 29%, respectively); (b) improvement in the impact e§ect of
output with respect to an interest rate shock (46%) exceeds that of the money base shock
(39%); and (c) improvement in the correlation between the output and money base, and
output and interest rate by 27% and 18%, respectively. In the absence of RT consumers,
therefore, the transmission mechanism from policy interest rate can be enhanced either by
a similar magnitude or even a bigger magnitude compared to the monetary base. Hence,
the prevalence of RT consumer in the economy plays a crucial role in explaining the weak
monetary transmission in India.
6 Conclusion
The key research question of this paper is: what explains weak monetary policy transmission
in India? We construct a closed economy NK-DSGE model with banking and financial
frictions and an informal sector calibrated to the Indian economy to address this question.
The predominant channel of monetary transmission in our model is a credit channel. Our
analysis is general enough to lend itself to the study of monetary transmission in other
EMDEs.
In a comparison of output impulse responses of monetary base versus policy rate shocks,
the baseline model shows that the output response is much more prolonged for a positive
shock to the monetary base as opposed to the interest rate. The impact e§ect of output
with respect to a monetary base shock is significantly bigger than the output response with
respect to a negative policy rate shock. In addition, the positive e§ect lasts more than 20
quarters for a monetary base shock, while for the interest rate shock it dissipates after 10
quarters. The punch-line of this exercise is that a shock to the monetary base has a far
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stronger and persistent e§ect on output than a shock to the policy interest rate. This agrees
well with the empirical SRVAR impulse responses reported in Section 2.
The baseline model also shows that the major part of output fluctuations are explained
by real shocks to the economy (TFP shocks) rather than nominal shocks (base money and
interest rate shocks from the Taylor rule). Fiscal policy shocks have a fairly large role to
play in explaining output variation, but a lesser role in other macroeconomic aggregates.
IST shocks have a negligible role in explaining output fluctuations in the economy.
In an extended version of the model with a transaction demand for money and segmented
labor markets, we show that the contribution of base money shocks and policy rate shocks to
output can increase almost by the similar magnitudes in the absence of the of rule of thumb
consumers. Transmission is hindered because an inflationary monetary policy reduces real
wages of the rule of thumb consumers, which reduces their consumption. Our results suggest
that the presence of rule of thumb consumers weakens monetary transmission in India.
Finally, our paper also addresses a long standing hypotheses in the policy discussion on
the impediments to monetary transmission. A prominent hypothesis in India is that the
existence of an administered postal sector could undermine the role of monetary policy. A
second hypothesis is that financial repression, in the form of a statutory liquidity ratio, raises
the cost of funds facing banks, which weakens the e¢cacy of monetary policy. The calibrated
baseline model does not lend support to either of these two hypotheses. The impulse response
and variance decompositions of monetary policy shock are robustly invariant to changes in
the administered postal rate, allocation of deposits between these two savings instruments,
and to changes in the statutory liquidity ratio. Our results therefore suggest that while
banking sector frictions do not impact monetary transmission significantly, the presence of
an informal sector does.
Our model is able to explain weak monetary transmission which is an endemic feature
of the Indian economy as well as other EMDEs. A possible extension of our model would
be to incorporate segmentation and linkages between formal and informal finance, a duality
that is characteristic of many EMDEs, and frictions in the goods markets (such as barriers
to entry and competition) coupled with segmented labour markets to proxy better for the
informal sector. We leave these extensions for future research.
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Impulse response of Growth rate of Money Base












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Impulse response of Policy Interest rate
Figure 2: SRVAR impulse responses to a one standard deviation decrease in policy interest
rate
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Figure 5: Impulse responses with respect to a negative policy interest rate shock












Real Credit under money base shock
Real Credit under policy rate shock
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Figure B: Response of  F and RT households consumption to interest rate shock
Figure 7: Consumption responses to a positive monetary base shock and negative policy
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Figure B: Response of  output to interest rate shock
Figure 8: Output responses to a positive money base and negative policy interest rate
shock in both models
List of Tables
Table 1: Sign restrictions
Shocks Output Credit Inflation Policy Instrument
Money base shock ? ? > 0 > 0
Interest rate shock ? ? > 0 < 0
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Table 2: Baseline parameter values
Parameters Description Value Source
α Share of capital 0.30 Banerjee & Basu, 2017
β Discount rate 0.98 Gabriel et al., 2011
η Preference for holding bank deposit 0.84 RBI database
δk Depreciation rate of capital 0.025 Banerjee & Basu, 2017
κ Investment adjustment cost 2 Banerjee & Basu, 2017
ζ Mark-down factor for deposit rate 0.97 Set to match the savings account rate
"Y Price elasticity of demand 7 Gabriel et al., 2011
φp Price adjustment cost 118 Anand et al., 2010
θp Past inflation indexation 0.58 Sahu J. P., 2013
ρiG Interest rate smoothing parameter 0.66 Gabriel et al., 2011
'π Inflation stabilizing coe¢cient 1.20 Gabriel et al., 2011
'y Output stabilizing coe¢cient 0.50 Banerjee & Basu, 2017
αq Statutory Liquidity Ratio 19.25% RBI Database
π Long-run inflation target 4% Urjit Patel Committee Report, 2013
iG Steady state policy rate 6.875% RBI Database
ia Steady state administered rate 4% Indian Postal Service Website
ip Steady state penalty rate 7.5% RBI Database
Table 3: Baseline parameterization of shock processes
Parameters Description Values
ρa Persistence coe¢cient of TFP shock 0.82
ρ
Zx
Persistence coe¢cient of IST shock 0.63
ρG Persistence coe¢cient of Fiscal shock 0.59
ρµ Persistence coe¢cient of Money base shock 0.32
σa Standard error of TFP shock 0.016
σZx Standard error of IST shock 0.133
σG Standard error of Fiscal shock 0.026
σµ Standard error of Money base shock 0.042
σiG Standard error of Interest rate shock 0.002
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Table 4: Results of moment matching between the data and model 1
Targeted Moments Non-targeted Moments
Moment Data Model Moment Data Confidence Interval Model
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0.68 [0.54, 0.78] 0.58
correl [Y,C] 0.37 0.36 correl [l, π] 0.37 [0.17, 0.54] 0.34











0.59 0.77 correl [d, I] 0.49 [0.31, 0.64] 0.38










-0.43 -0.66 AR(1) coe¢cient of l 0.92 [0.88, 0.95] 0.92
Table 5: Results of moment matching between the data and model 2
Targeted Moments Non-targeted Moments
Moment Data Model Moment Data Confidence Interval Model
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correl [Y,C] 0.37 0.37 correl [l, π] 0.37 [0.17, 0.54] 0.37











0.59 0.76 correl [d, I] 0.49 [0.31, 0.64] 0.40










-0.43 -0.65 AR(1) coe¢cient of l 0.92 [0.88, 0.95] 0.91
Table 6: Variance decomposition results for major macroeconomic variables
List of ξa ξZx ξG ξµ ξi
G
Variab les M odel 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Y 45.11 45.62 2.40 2.13 31.49 35.91 20.01 15.59 1.00 0.76
C 38.61 46.27 29.38 30.36 10.19 8.83 20.32 13.46 1.50 1.08
I 27.44 25.14 58.24 58.76 3.09 3.16 10.98 12.69 0.25 0.25
π 50.80 48.35 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.15 48.82 51.31 0.07 0.07
iL 49.20 47.30 1.08 0.93 6.43 6.31 40.59 42.91 2.70 2.55
iG 21.76 20.64 0.41 0.40 2.51 2.82 73.20 73.90 2.11 2.23(
iL − iD
)
45.78 44.99 1.40 1.09 12.00 12.02 31.87 33.39 8.94 8.51
l 26.02 24.28 51.16 51.05 4.63 4.74 17.29 19.03 0.90 0.90
d 19.80 19.79 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.04 80.01 80.03 0.01 0.01
da 39.84 37.12 0.56 0.54 3.58 3.80 54.80 57.30 1.22 1.24
x 20.96 21.00 0.13 0.12 0.03 0.03 78.87 78.85 0.01 0.01
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Table 7: Sensitivity experiments for monetary transmission to output
Sensitiv ity Share of ξµ in FEVD in Y Share of ξi
G




Experim ents Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Baseline 20.01 15.59 1.00 0.76 0.28 0.22 0.25 0.22
η =0.756 20.01 15.64 1.00 0.76 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.22
ia=0.036 20.01 15.59 1.00 0.76 0.28 0.22 0.25 0.22
αq=0.1733 20.01 15.59 1.00 0.76 0.28 0.22 0.25 0.22
φp=106 17.79 13.59 0.93 0.70 0.27 0.22 0.21 0.18
θp=0.522 21.72 16.97 1.04 0.80 0.28 0.22 0.29 0.26
ζ=0.873 61.05 58.32 0.19 0.14 0.51 0.43 0.69 0.69
ρiG=0.594 19.14 14.52 0.62 0.45 0.25 0.21 0.27 0.23
'π=1.08 25.92 21.12 1.01 0.78 0.31 0.26 0.34 0.31
'y=0.45 20.26 15.84 0.98 0.75 0.28 0.23 0.24 0.21
Table 8: Monetary transmission in model 2
1. A positive monetary base shock
(a) ξµt "=> πt " via money supply rule => iDt " via Taylor rule => dt " and dat #
(b) Higher πt => with price stickiness real mc
PWt
Pt
" => VMPL shifts out => Y "
(c) Higher πt => Consumption of RT # => adverse demand side e§ect => Y #
2. A negative policy rate shock
(a) iGt #=> iDt # via mark down rule => dt # => xt # => Given MBt , Pt "=> πt "
(b) Higher πt => with price stickiness real mc
PWt
Pt
" => VMPL shifts out => Y "
(c) Higher πt => Consumption of RT # => adverse demand side e§ect => Y #
Table 9: Comparing frictions in the transmission of monetary base shock from model 2
Relevant Baseline A fter changing Baseline Param eters by 50%
Param eters Value FEVD of Y (in % ) I.E . of Y (in % ) correl w ith Y Value FEVD of Y (in % ) I.E . of Y (in % ) correl w ith Y
ia 0.040 15.59 0.23 0.22 0.060 15.59 0.23 0.22
αq 0.1925 15.59 0.23 0.22 0.2888 15.59 0.23 0.22
η 0.840 15.59 0.23 0.22 0.420 16.06 0.23 0.23
φ 0.350 15.59 0.23 0.22 0.525 13.41 0.18 0.19
Table 10: Comparing frictions in the transmission of interest rate shock from model 2
Relevant Baseline A fter changing Baseline Param eters by 50%
Param eters Value FEVD of Y (in % ) I.E . of Y (in % ) correl w ith Y Value FEVD of Y (in % ) I.E . of Y (in % ) correl w ith Y
ia 0.040 0.76 0.08 0.22 0.060 0.76 0.08 0.22
αq 0.1925 0.76 0.08 0.22 0.2888 0.76 0.08 0.22
η 0.840 0.76 0.08 0.22 0.420 0.75 0.08 0.23
φ 0.350 0.76 0.08 0.22 0.525 0.70 0.06 0.20
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